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Nuclear Weapons and International Law:
Towards a Declaration on the
Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime Of Nuclear Humancide*
By MATTHEW LIPPMAN**
Change brings change inexorably, and nothing stands still -
thirty-five years have now passed since that day of disaster.
On that day, Hiroshima took the brunt of the age of nuclear war,
in an infernal and scorching blast. Since that day, she has been ever
calling for an end to nuclear weapons, praying for a lasting peace for
man.
It is now high time for us to call for the solidarity of all mankind,
and to shift our common path away from self-destruction towards
survival.
Today, on the occasion of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the atomic
bombing, we pray devoutly for the repose of the souls of the A-bomb
victims; . . . and we pledge all our efforts to ensure the survival of
mankind.
The City of Hiroshima
Peace Declaration
August 6, 1980
* This article is dedicated to the memory of Professor Philip J. Meranto, University of
Colorado, Denver. Professor Meranto devoted his personal and scholarly life to the struggle
for social justice. We shall miss his noble and passionate spirit and presence.
** Associate Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chi-
cago. B.A., American University; M.A., Northwestern University; Ph.D., Northwestern Uni-
versity; J.D., American University; LL.M., Harvard University.
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On August 9, 1945 the city of Nagasaki turned into an inferno
beyond human imagination and more than 70,000 precious lives were
obliterated.
Here we pray for the eternal repose of the atomic bomb victims and in
the name of the citizens of Nagasaki we appeal for a firm advancement
in the realization of everlasting world peace and a total ban on nuclear
weapons.
The City of Nagasaki
Peace Declaration
August 9, 1980
I. INTRODUCTION
August 6 and 9, 1985 marked the fortieth anniversary of the
dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan.
Since the first use of the atomic bomb, there has been an expansion in
the number, power and sophistication of nuclear weapons. This in-
crease in nuclear weapons has been accompanied by the adoption of
numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties limiting the type and use
of these weapons.
In this Article, it is argued that the international attempts to reg-
ulate nuclear weapons have been unsuccessful' and that the threat of
nuclear war can be eradicated only through the formal recognition
that the possession and use of nuclear weapons is illegal under inter-
national law. As a first step towards prohibiting the possession and
use of nuclear weapons, it is proposed that a Declaration on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Nuclear Humancide2 should
be drafted.
Nuclear weapons are central components of various nation-
states' nuclear arsenals and the proposed Declaration on Nuclear
Humancide may be dismissed as naive or idealistic. However, one of
the lawyers' traditional roles has been,
the area of regime building, of inventing and constituting institu-
1. See Meyrowitz, The Laws of War and Nuclear Weapons, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
227, 240 (1983). "Technological innovation rapidly outstripped the capability of the interna-
tional legal system to respond .... " Id.
2. The term humancide refers to the killing of humanity. It is derived from the term
genocide which literally means the killing of a race or tribe. See generally, Lippman, The
Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 3
B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 1-5 (1984).
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tions and structures that are capable of coping with major misfea-
sance of malfunction . . . . Lawyers . . . are especially well
equipped for what McDougal would call the constitutive enter-
prise, although shamefully few are now seriously engaged in map-
ping out those alternatives to the present madness that realistically
could enhance our collective national and international security
without endangering our biological survival.
3
Eliot Meyrowitz observes that,
It is practical, not idealistic, to take international law seriously.
We would be more secure as people, not less, if our governmental
leaders were to try to conform national policy to the minimal obli-
gations of international law. To assume the legality of a weapon
with the distinct capability to terrorize and to destroy an entire
civilian population would make meaningless the entire effort to
limit combat through law.
4
Before outlining a possible Declaration on Nuclear Humancide, it is
necessary to examine current nuclear policy.
II. THE UNITED STATES CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
The arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union
has escalated rapidly over the last thirty years. In 1960 the United
States possessed 6,500 nuclear warheads while today the United
States has close to 11,000 warheads. During the same period, the So-
viet Union increased its nuclear arsenal from 300 to over 8,000 war-
heads. Counting tactical and strategic warheads, together the two
superpowers possess close to 50,000 nuclear warheads.5
United States nuclear missiles generally are more accurate than
are Soviet missiles. The Soviet Union has compensated for this tech-
nological disadvantage by building heavier missiles capable of in-
flicting greater damage on impact. 6 The United States has distributed
its missiles across the strategic triad while the Soviet Union has con-
3. Weston, Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Illegality in Context, DENVER J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (1983) (Myres S. McDougal Distinguished Lecture).
4. Meyrowitz, supra note 1, at 257 (emphasis added).
5. GROUND ZERO, NUCLEAR WAR: WHAT'S IN IT FOR You?, Appendix C, Table c. 1
(1982); E. KENNEDY AND M. HATFIELD, FREEZE! How You CAN HELP PREVENT NU-
CLEAR WAR 12-14 (1982). Tactical nuclear weapons are designed for use during a conven-
tional, limited battlefield situation. Strategic nuclear weapons are designed for use across long
geographic distances and national boundaries.
6. The megatonnage weight of a weapon is referred to as a weapon's "throw-weight."
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centrated its nuclear warheads on land-based missiles.7
The superpowers' present nuclear arsenals represent "a million
Hiroshimas" 8: "If an explosion equivalent to one Hiroshima bomb
went off every hour, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, it
would take almost 115 years to detonate all of the nuclear explosives
presently stockpiled by the two superpowers."9
One submarine, equipped with nuclear missiles, can inflict more
damage than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs combined. The
captain of an American Poseidon submarine is able to:
fire some 160 independently targetable nuclear warheads, each
with a yield several times larger than those that destroyed Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki against as many Soviet cities. If optimally
targeted against the Soviet population, this alone could inffict some
30 million fatalities. One clear fact of the present strategic rela-
tionship is that the urban societies of both the United States and
the Soviet Union are completely vulnerable to even a small fraction
of the other side's accumulated stockpile of nuclear weapons.' 0
Accompanying this expansion in the number and destructive ca-
pacity of the superpowers' nuclear arsenals has been the development
of a strategic doctrine which considers nuclear weapons as being ap-
propriate for use in a limited war, one with geographically limited,
short-term objectives, rather than as being reserved for use during a
total war.
The doctrines which guided United States nuclear policy during
the 1950's and 1960's were those of "massive retaliation""II and "mu-
tually assured destruction."' 12 These doctrines were designed to deter
the Soviet Union from using nuclear weapons by clearly establishing
the United States' intention to respond to a Soviet nuclear attack with
a counter-attack which would inflict an unacceptable level of damage
on the Soviet population, military, and economic infra-structure.
Under the "massive retaliation" and "mutually assured destruction"
doctrines, nuclear weapons were viewed as weapons of "last resort."
7. The strategic triad is composed of land-based, sea-based, and air-based missiles.
8. Bates, The Medical and Ecological Effects of Nuclear War, 28 McGILL L.J. 716, 719
(1983).
9. Id.
10. Keeny & Panofsky, MAD versus NUTS: Can Doctrine or Weaponry Remedy The
Mutual Hostage Relationship of the Superpowers, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 287, 293 (198 1/1982).
11. See generally Dulles, Policy For Security And Peace, 32 FOREIGN AFF. 353 (1954).
12. See McNamara, Defense Arrangements of the North Atlantic Community, 47 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 64 (July 9, 1962).
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The contemporary generation of strategic thinkers have advo-
cated that the United States adopt a "war-fighting" strategy premised
on the United States' willingness and ability to initiate, fight and win a
nuclear war. Under this "war-fighting" strategy, nuclear weapons are
viewed as one of various options available to a military commander
faced with a Soviet threat. Keeny and Panofsky have termed this
strategy nuclear utilization target selection (NUTS). "NUTS [seeks]
to utilize nuclear weapons against specific targets in a complex of nu-
clear war-fighting situations intended to be limited, as well as the
management over an extended period of a general nuclear war be-
tween the superpowers."'
13
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, in his 1984 report, lists
one of the objectives of United States nuclear policy as:
in the event of an attack, to deny the enemy his objectives and
bring a rapid end to the conflict on terms favorable to our interests;
and to maintain the political and territorial integrity of the United
States and its allies. . . .[S]hould deterrence fail, our strategy is to
restore peace on favorable terms. 14
In his 1985 report, the Secretary of Defense reaffirms this war-fighting
strategy: "We must plan for flexibility in our forces and in our op-
tions for response, so that we might terminate the conflict on terms
favorable to the forces of freedom, and reestablish deterrence at the
lowest possible level of violence, thus avoiding further destruction."' 15
NUTS theorists have portrayed this "war-fighting" deployment
13. Keeny & Panofsky, supra note 10, at 289. See generally R.C. ALDRIDGE, FIRST
STRIKE: THE PENTAGON'S STRATEGY FOR NUCLEAR WAR (1983).
14. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR W.
WEINBERGER 16, 32 (1984).
15. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR W.
WEINBERGER 24 (1985). Secretary of Defense Weinberger reiterated this war-fighting strategy
in a letter to social commentator Theodore Draper:
[I]t would be militarily, politically and morally unsound to confine the President to
resorting either to capitulation or massive retaliation. The consequences for the
United States and our allies in either case would be unacceptable. Accordingly, our
policy requires that if necessary, we prevail in denying victory to the Soviets and in
protecting the sovereignty and continued viability of the United States and of the
Western democracies as free societies. . . . It should be apparent that if our forces
cannot be used effectively, if necessary, neither can they credibly deter.
T. DRAPER, PRESENT HISTORY 48, 49 (1983).
The "flexible response" doctrine has its origins in the Ford and Carter Administrations.
See generally, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES R.
SCHLESINGER 38 (1975); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT OF SECRETARY OF DE-
FENSE JAMES SCHLESINGER II 6-7 (1976); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT OF SECRE-
TARY OF DEFENSE HAROLD BROWN 5-6 (1981).
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of nuclear weapons as humanitarian in that nuclear weapons are to be
used to resolve a conflict before either superpower feels compelled to
resort to an all-out nuclear attack. NUTS "could enable both sides to
avoid the killing of vast millions and yet to inflict assured destruction
on military, industrial and transportation assets - the sinews and
muscles of the regime initiating war." 16 The United States, it is ar-
gued, is capable of defeating the Soviet Union with a targeting strat-
egy designed to "destroy key leadership cadres, their means of
communication, and some of the instruments of domestic control."
17
It is estimated that "a combination of counterforce offensive target-
ing,"' civil defense and ballistic missile and air defense should hold
U.S. casualties down to a level compatible with national survival and
recovery," and ensure the "emergence of a postwar world order com-
patible with Western values."' 9
According to advocates of NUTS, this "war-fighting" strategy
already has been adopted by the Soviet Union. Harvard Professor
Richard Pipes notes that "there is something innately destabilizing in
the very fact that we consider nuclear war unfeasible and suicidal for
both, and our chief adversary views it as feasible and winnable for
himself." 2
0
This essay considers under which circumstances the United
States would employ a nuclear war-fighting strategy. In a 1984 letter
to Jeremy J. Stone, Director of the Federation of American Scientists,
Defense Department general counsel Chapman B. Cox stated that the
United States would use "any of the weapons" in its arsenal, includ-
ing intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles in re-
sponse to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Cox added that the
President would not consult the United States Senate prior to the de-
ployment of nuclear weapons since this would "tend to undermine"
NATO's defense and "threaten NATO's ability to deter Soviet ag-
gression."' 2' According to one poll, only twenty percent of Americans
realized that it was United States policy to use nuclear weapons in
16. Ikle, Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century, 51 FOREIGN AFF. 267, 282
(1973).
17. Gray & Payne, Victory is Possible, 39 FOREIGN POL'Y 14, 21 (1980).
18. Counterforce targeting is a nuclear attack directed against the enemy's military
forces. Countervalue targeting is a nuclear attack directed against the enemy's population.
19. Gray & Payne, supra note 17, at 21, 25.
20. Pipes, Why The Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War, 64
COMMENTARY 21, 34 (1977).
21. War is War: U.S. Backs Nuclear Option, Chi. Tribune, Sept. 9, 1985, at 6, col. 5. See
generally Stone, Presidential First Use Is Lawful, 56 FOREIGN POL'Y 94 (1984).
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response to a conventional Soviet attack on Western Europe; eighty
percent of Americans believed that it was United States policy to use
nuclear weapons only in response to a Soviet nuclear attack on the
United States.2
2
Critics of the new war-fighting nuclear doctrine argue that "it
does not seem possible, even in the most specialized utilization of nu-
clear weapons, to envisage any situation where escalation to general
nuclear war would probably not occur. ' 23 Leon Wieseltier has criti-
cized the concept of nuclear war-termination:
It is not enough to want to end a nuclear war. You must be able
to. War termination must not only be posited; it must be planned.
The mighty military, strategic and technological tendencies of
America's nuclear arsenal cannot be reversed or redirected in a
time of crisis or a time of war. By then it will be too late ....
There is no evidence, however, that the Pentagon, even during the
tenure of officials who understood the immense importance of nu-
clear war termination, has developed plans to end the war with
anything like the devotion that it has developed plans to fight the
war. 24
The public fear that the nuclear war-fighting doctrine will lead to
the capricious use of nuclear weapons has been heightened by provoc-
ative comments by political leaders regarding the possible use of nu-
clear weapons, 25 and by several potentially dangerous accidents
involving nuclear weapons. 26 In January 1985, twenty-nine percent of
Americans considered nuclear war very or fairly likely in the next
decade (in June 1981 the percentage was forty-seven percent); fifty-
two percent of Americans believed that the threat from Moscow was
"constantly growing" (in September 1983 the percentage was sixty-
four percent); and a majority of Americans did not believe that the
Soviets desired to reach a new arms agreement and felt that the Sovi-
ets had violated the terms of past arms agreement.
27
Nuclear war thus arguably is coming to be perceived as inevita-
ble by American strategic thinkers and by a substantial segment of the
22. See Chi. Tribune, supra note 21.
23. Keeny & Panofsky, supra note 10, at 290-91.
24. Wieseltier, When Deterrence Fails, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 827, 840 (1985).
25. President's Joke About Bombing Leaves Press in Europe Unamused, N.Y. Times, Aug.
14, 1984, at 8, col. 4.
26. Soviet Cruise Missile Said to Stray Across Norway and Into Finland, N.Y. Times, Jan.
3, 1985, at 1, col. 5; Weinberger in Error, Says Soviet Downed Own Missile, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1,
1985, at 3, col. 5.
27. Poll Shows Skepticism on Arms Pact, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1985, at 8, col. 1.
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American population. The danger is that an American political
leader faced with a perceived Soviet threat may precipitously initiate a
nuclear strike in order to preempt an anticipated Soviet attack.
III. THE IMPACT OF NUCLEAR WAR
Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the only known instances of an
atomic bomb being dropped on a populated urban area. These two
"announced United States nuclear tests" resulted in the death of be-
tween 60,000 and 300,000 persons.28 Surveying the damage resulting
from the Hiroshima-Nagasaki bombings, The Committee for the
Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki concludes that "the magnitude of the kill-
ing is, in essence, better termed genocide - if not also sociocide, eco-
cide, biocide, and earthocide - for it is a complete negation of human
existence. . . .man at last can devise the means for ending all human
life." 29
The damage inflicted against Hiroshima and Nagasaki pales in
comparison with the likely effects of a contemporary nuclear ex-
change. The explosions in Japan were in the range of fifteen-to-
twenty kilotons, slightly above the level of what today is regarded as a
tactical nuclear weapon. A modem city of between 300,000 and
400,000 inhabitants would probably be targeted by a one megaton
bomb - "a bomb fifty to seventy times larger" 30 than those dropped
on Hiroshima-Nagasaki. A larger population center likely would be
targeted by a nuclear bomb "equivalent to two hundred Hiroshimas
(three to five megatons)."'31 The detonation of a relatively small one
megaton bomb two miles above a city would have three main effects
- blast, thermal and nuclear radiation. 3
2
A nuclear explosion results in the emission of a fireball with a
temperature and pressure equivalent to that at the center of the sun.
A blast wave will move out from the fireball in a widening circle at
supersonic speed followed by high winds with twice the velocity of a
28. R. WASSERMAN & N. SOLOMON, KILLING OUR OWN: THE DISASTER OF
AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE WITH ATOMIC RADIATION 6 (1982).
29. THE COMMITTEE FOR THE COMPILATION OF MATERIALS ON DAMAGE CAUSED BY
THE ATOMIC BOMBS IN HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI: THE
PHYSICAL, MEDICAL, AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS 340-41 (E. Ishikawa
and D.L. Swain trans. 1981).
30. Bates, supra note 8, at 718-19.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 722.
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hurricane. Within two miles of ground zero all structures will be de-
stroyed and within four miles of ground zero only the steel frames of
buildings will be able to withstand the hurricane-like winds.
33
The nuclear explosion also will result in a heat wave being radi-
ated from the fireball at the speed of light which will ignite flammable
objects within a three-to-five mile radius. Fires caused by this thermal
radiation will coalesce into a firestorm with temperatures which will
reach 1,500 degrees Fahrenheit. These fires will incinerate, asphyxi-
ate and suffocate most of the individuals in their path. Ten miles from
ground zero, the thermal radiation will be sufficient to cause second
degree burns to exposed skin; and as far as thirty miles from ground
zero, individuals looking at the fireball will suffer retina burns and,
possibly, blindness. 3
4
Individuals at the point of explosion will be exposed to radioac-
tive fallout which will cause severe burns and biological damage.
Most radioactive material will be swept into clouds of radioactive dust
and carried thousands of miles down-wind where it will contaminate
the food chain and water supply. Individuals digesting radioactive
particles may contract cancer, leukemia, genetic damage, sterility,
cataracts and birth defects.
35
This one megaton bomb will result in the devastation of an area
twenty-five miles in diameter, the fifteen-mile core of which will be
destroyed. 36 One third of the population within this area will die im-
mediately, including close to one hundred percent of those individuals
within a two-mile radius. Another third of the individuals will be
seriously injured and many of them ultimately will die due to a
shortage of medical assistance and supplies.
37
The detonation of one-half of the megatons in the current United
States and Soviet arsenals would result in approximately seven hun-
dred and fifty million immediate deaths; three hundred and forty mil-
lion persons being seriously injured; and two hundred million
"healthy" survivors.3 These survivors will inherit what Jonathan
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 725, 729.
36. Id. at 724.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 726. See generally, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, EF-
FECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR (1979); U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT,
THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR (1979).
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Schell terms "a Republic of Insects and Grass" 39 - there will be a
loss of communication, transportation, utilities, electricity, food and
water, and there will be a spread of smallpox, cholera, typhoid fever
and a complete breakdown of social organization. 4°
The ability of the survivors to overcome these difficulties will be
complicated by the fact that the detonation of between five hundred
and two thousand nuclear warheads may possibly result in the partial
destruction of the ozone layer. The ozone layer both protects the
earth's surface from the ultraviolet radiation contained within sun-
light which radiates the heat reflected from the earth's surface back to
earth. The damaging of the ozone layer, combined with the dust and
smoke lofted into the atmosphere by a nuclear explosion, will result in
a cooling of the earth's surface. 41 This cooling could result in the
onset of a "nuclear winter" 42 which, among other results, may
cut the biological productivity of deciduous forests by as much as
twenty percent, shift the monsoons in Asia in a way that could be
ruinous for both agriculture and ecosystems, and eliminate all
wheat-growing in Canada. . . . Another global consequence of
the injection of oxides of nitrogen into the stratosphere by nuclear
explosions would be pollution of the environment as these gases fell
back into the stroposphere.
43
This ecological imbalance would drastically reduce the world's food
supply and "large numbers of people there would die of starvation." 4
4
Doctor Don G. Bates observes that "[A] combination of popula-
tion thinning through immediate decimation, the subsequent ravages
of disease, famine and social disorder, relative infertility and short-
ened life spans, and a climatically unsupportive environment conceiv-
ably could push man into the position of an endangered species."' 45
IV. CONTROLLING THE NUCLEAR THREAT
Three approaches have been developed for controlling the de-
ployment and use of nuclear weapons: the concept of the nuclear free
zone; the prohibition on the transfer and testing of nuclear weapons;
39. J. SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH 3-96 (1982).
40. Bates, supra note 8, at 726, 727.
41. Sagan, Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: Some Policy Implications, 62 FOR-
EIGN AFF. 257 (1983/84).
42. Id.
43. J. SCHELL, supra note 39, at 89.
44. Sagan, supra note 41, at 272.
45. Bates, supra note 8, at 730.
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and bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet
Union limiting the number and type of nuclear weapons deployed by
the two superpowers.
A. The Nuclear Free Zone
The nuclear free zone concept prohibits the testing and the de-
ployment of nuclear weapons in geographic areas in which nuclear
weapons previously have not been introduced.
The Treaty of Tlatelolco 46 obligates twenty-two Latin American
States to limit the use of nuclear materials and facilities within their
jurisdiction "exclusively for peaceful purposes" 47 and "to prohibit and
prevent in their respective territories:
'48
(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by
any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties
themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in
any other way, and
(b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of
possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the
Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way.
2. The Contracting Parties also undertake to refrain from engag-
ing in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any
way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, pos-
session or control of any nuclear weapon.49
The Contracting States are obligated to submit semi-annual re-
ports to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEG) "stating
that no activity prohibited under this Treaty has occurred in their
respective territories."50 Signatory States also are required to enter
into agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency agree-
ing to adhere to IAEA safeguards on the Signatory States' nuclear
46. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 22
U.S.T. 754, at 762, T.I.A.S. No. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 [hereinafter cited as Latin America
Nuclear Weapons Treaty].
47. Id. at art. 1.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at art. 14, which provides:
1. The Contracting Parties shall submit to the Agency and to the International
Atomic Energy Agency, for their information, semi-annual reports stating that no
activity prohibited under this Treaty has occurred in their respective territories.
2. The Contracting Parties shall simultaneously transmit to the Agency a copy
of any report they may submit to the International Atomic Energy Agency which
relates to matters that are the subject of this Treaty and to the application of
safeguards.
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activities.5' The IAEA, and under certain circumstances the Council
of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America,52 are empowered under Article Sixteen to conduct "special
inspections" to insure that Contracting Parties are complying with
the terms of the Treaty.
53
The General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 54 when non-compliance with the
Treaty "might endanger peace and security, . . . shall report thereon
simultaneously to the. . . United Nations, and to the Council of the
Organization of American States" who shall take appropriate
action.55
51. Id. at art. 13. "Each Contracting Party shall negotiate multilateral or bilateral agree-
ments with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of its safeguards to its
nuclear activities." Id.
52. Id. at art. 7, which provides:
1. In order to ensure compliance with the obligations of this Treaty, the Con-
tracting Parties hereby establish an international organization to be known as the
Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America ....
2. The Agency shall be responsible for the holding of periodic or extraordinary
consultations among member States on matters relating to the purposes, measures
and procedures set forth in this Treaty and to the supervision of compliance with the
obligations arising therefrom.
3. The Contracting Parties agree to extend to the Agency full and prompt co-
operation in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, of any agreements they
may conclude with the Agency and of any agreements the Agency may conclude
with any other international organization or body.
4. The headquarters of the Agency shall be in Mexico City.
Id.
53. Id. at art. 16, which reads:
1. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Council established by
this Treaty have the power of carrying out special inspections in the following cases:
(a) In the case of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with
the agreements referred to in article 13 of this Treaty;
(b) In the case of the Council:
(i) When so requested, the reasons for the request being stated, by any Party
which suspects that some activity prohibited by this Treaty has been carried out
or is about to be carried out, either in the territory of any other Party or in any
other place on such latter Party's behalf ....
(ii) When requested by any Party which has been suspected of or charged with
having violated the Treaty, the Council shall immediately arrange for the special
inspection requested . ...
Id.
54. Id. at art. 9, which provides:
1. The General Conference, the supreme organ of the Agency, shall be com-
posed of all the Contracting Parties; it shall hold regular sessions every two years,
and may also hold special sessions whenever this Treaty so provides or, in the opin-
ion of the Council, the circumstances so require . . ..
[21(c) Shall elect the members of the Council and the General Secretary.
Id.
55. Id. at art. 20. Article 20 reads:
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Protocol I obligates nuclear states with de jure or de facto inter-
national responsibility for territories within Latin America to apply
"the status of denuclearization" within such territories. 56 Treaty Pro-
tocol II obligates contracting nuclear powers to respect the Latin
American nuclear free zone57 and to undertake "not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.
58
The Antarctic Treaty 9 provides that Antarctica is to be:
1. [U]sed for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited,
inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establish-
ment of military bases and fortifications, and carrying out of mili-
tary maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military per-
sonnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peace-
ful purposes. 6°
Article V(l) prohibits "any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and
I. The General Conference shall take note of all cases in which, in its opinion,
any Contracting Party is not complying fully with its obligations under this Treaty
and shall draw the matter to the attention of the Party concerned, making such rec-
ommendations as it deems appropriate.
2. If, in its opinion, such non-compliance constitutes a violation of this Treaty
which might endanger peace and security, the General Conference shall report
thereon simultaneously to the [United Nations] Security Council and the General
Assembly through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to the Council
of the Organization of American States. The General Conference shall likewise re-
port to the International Atomic Energy Agency for such purposes as are relevant in
accordance with its Statute.
Id.
56. Additional Protocol I to Latin America Nuclear Weapons Treaty, supra note 46, 22
U.S.T. 754, at 786, T.I.A.S. No. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 281, at 362.
Article 1. To undertake to apply the status of denuclearization in respect of
warlike purposes as defined in articles 1, 3, 5 and 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in territories for which, de jure or de facto,
they are internationally responsible and which lie within the limits of the geographi-
cal zone established in that Treaty.
Id.
57. Additional Protocol II to Latin America Nuclear Weapons Treaty, 22 U.S.T. 754, at
755, T.I.A.S. No. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 281, at 364.
Article 2. The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries under-
take, therefore, not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a
violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty in the territories to which the
Treaty applies . ...
Article 3. The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries also
undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting
Parties of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.
Id.
58. Id.
59. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
60. Id. at art. I.
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the disposal there of radioactive waste .... ",61 The Treaty is to be
enforced by observers designated by the Contracting Parties.62
The Seabed Arms Control Treaty63 obligates States Parties
not to emplant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in
the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limit of a seabed zone ....
any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass de-
struction as well as structures, launching installations or any other
facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such
weapons. 64
The States Parties to the Seabed Treaty "undertake not to assist,
encourage or induce any State to carry out [these] activities .... "65
In order to ensure compliance with the Treaty, each State Party to the
Treaty shall have the right "to verify through observations the activi-
ties of other States Parties to the Treaty on the seabed and the ocean
floor and in the subsoil thereof."
66
A State Party which has "reasonable doubts" concerning
whether a State is fulfilling its obligations under the Seabed Treaty is
entitled to consult with the State Party which it believes to be in viola-
tion of the Treaty. The Parties concerned "shall cooperate on such
further procedures for verification as may be agreed. . . . After com-
pletion of the further procedures for verification, an appropriate re-
port shall be circulated to the other Parties by the Party that initiated
such procedures. ' 67 If "consultation and cooperation . . . have not
removed the doubts concerning the activities and there remains a seri-
ous question concerning fulfillment of the obligations assumed under
this Treaty, a State Party may, . refer the matter to the Security
61. Id. at art. V(1).
62. Id. at art. VII, which provides:
1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provi-
sions of the present treaty, each Contracting Party. . . shall have the right to desig-
nate observers to carry out any inspection provided for by the present Article.
Observers shall be nationals of the Contracting Parties which designate them. The
names of observers shall be communicated to every other Contracting Party having
the right to designate observers, and like notice shall be given of the termination of
their appointment.
Id.
63. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weap-
ons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb.
11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337.
64. Id. at art. I(1). Article II defines the "outer limit of the seabed zone as... cotermi-
nous with the twelve-mile outer limit." Id. at art. II.
65. Id. at art. 1(3).
66. Id. at art. III(1).
67. Id. at art. 111(2).
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Council, which may take action in accordance with the Charter." 68
The Outer Space Treaty,69 in Article IV, requires that "States
Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth
any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons
of mass destruction, instal [sic] such weapons on celestial bodies, or
station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. ' 70 "The
moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to
the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes."' 7' The Outer Space
Treaty is to be enforced through consultation between States Parties
concerning a State Parties' experiments or activities in space 72;
through State Parties' observations of other States Parties "stations,
installations, equipment and space vehicles in celestial bodies and
space flights"; 73 and through disclosure of the "nature, conduct, loca-
tions and results" of States Parties' activities in outer space.
74
68. Id. at art. 111(4).
69. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
70. Id. at art. IV.
71. Id.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty
exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations,
fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneu-
vers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific
research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any
equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celes-
tial bodies shall also not be prohibited.
Id.
72. Id. at art. IX, which reads:
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment
planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States
Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations
before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty
which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State
Party in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause
potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation
concerning the activity or experiment.
Id.
73. Id. at art. XII. "All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon
and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty
on a basis of reciprocity .... " Id.
See also art. X, which provides: -IT]he States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a
basis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an opportu-
nity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those States."
74. Id. at art. XI, which provides:
In order to promote international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of
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The nuclear free-zone approach has been successful in halting the
spread of nuclear weapons into those geographic areas covered under
the treaties. However, these areas, in general, are of minor strategic
significance. The existence of nuclear submarines and underground
missile silos, for instance, makes the emplacement of stationary nu-
clear weapons in the seabed unnecessary. In addition, States tend to
ignore the nuclear free-zones when they conflict with their self-inter-
est. For example, the testing of space-based Soviet and American
anti-satellite and anti-missile weapon systems threatens to erode the
Outer Space Treaty. 75 Also, the failure of Argentina, Brazil and Cuba
to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco76 and the United States' contingency
plan to abrogate the Treaty Protocols and to place nuclear weapons in
Puerto Rico and in Bermuda77 undermines the integrity of the Latin
American nuclear free zone. Finally, attempts to expand the nuclear
free zone to other areas, such as the Pacific Basin, have been opposed
by the superpowers.78
B. Prohibition on the Transfer and Testing of Nuclear Weapons
A complementary approach for controlling the spread of nuclear
weapons into various geographic regions and countries is the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty which has been ratified by ninety-three
states.79 In Article One, each States Party possessing nuclear
weapons:
undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any
outer space, States Parties to the Treaty conducting activities in outer space, includ-
ing the moon and other celestial bodies, agree to inform the Secretary-General of the
United Nations as well as the public and the international scientific community, to
the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and
results of such activities. On receiving the said information, the Secretary-General of
the United Nations should be prepared to disseminate it immediately and effectively.
Id.
75. See generally UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE FALLACY OF STAR WARS
(1983); but see Note, Antisatellite Weaponry: The High Road To Destruction, 3 B.U. INT'L L.J.
167 (1985).
76. U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND Dis-
ARMAMENT AGREEMENTS 80-81 (1984).
77. U.S. Plans for Deploying A-Arms Wasn't Disclosed to Host Nations, N.Y. Times, Feb.
13, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
78. See generally L.A. DUNN, CONTROLLING THE BOMB: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN
THE 1980's 131-32 (1982).
79. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
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way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State
to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nu-
clear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive
devices.80
Article II provides:
Each non-nuclear State Party to the Treaty. .. undertakes not to
receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manu-
facture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear ex-
plosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.
8 1
The Treaty does not affect the "inalienable right of all the Parties to
the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes. '8 2 However, each non-nuclear State Party,
undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be
negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy
Agency [IAEA] . . . , for the exclusive purpose of verification of
the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a
view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices .... s3
The provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty are supplemented
by bilateral agreements between nuclear supplier and recipient states.
The United States' bilateral agreements, for instance, generally specify
that a recipient state "grants the United States certain safeguard
rights, including inspections, to guarantee that the materials and
equipment are used solely for peaceful purposes."'84 The majority of
these "safeguard rights" may be transferred to the IAEA upon the
80. Id. at art. I.
81. Id. at art. II.
82. Id. at art. IV.
83. Id. at art. III(1).
Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide:
(a) source or special fissionable material, or
(b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or
production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for
peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to
the safeguards required by this article.
Id. at art. 111(2).
84. Doub & Weiss, International Nuclear Development in The Age of Interdependence, 32
VAND. L. REV. 843, 849 (1979); Agreement for Cooperation for Civil Uses of Atomic Energy,
July 11, 1969, United States-Austria, 21 U.S.T. 10, T.I.A.S. No. 6185.
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conclusion of a trilateral agreement between the United States, the
recipient state and the IAEA.
85
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty appears to have con-
trolled the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The world's nu-
clear generating capacity has expanded from five MWE's (electrical
megawatts) in one nation in 1954 to over 100,000 MWE's in twenty-
two countries in 1979. During the same period, only three nations
developed atomic weapons.
86
However, a number of nations - Pakistan, South Africa, Israel,
Brazil, Argentina and India - have failed to ratify the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty. 87 A Twentieth Century Fund study concluded that four
or five additional countries may acquire the bomb in the next decade
and that the world may be confronted by "runaway proliferation.
'88
The spirit of the non-proliferation treaty also has been violated by the
superpowers' stationing of nuclear missiles in NATO, Warsaw Pact
and other countries. 89
Another approach to limiting the development of nuclear arms is
controls on nuclear weapon testing. These testing limits primarily
control nuclear fallout, but also indirectly discourage the testing of
larger, more powerful nuclear weapons.90
In 1963 the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).91 The Treaty
prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explo-
sion by a State Party in an area under its jurisdiction or control:
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or
underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive
debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under
whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted .... 92
In 1974 the United States and the Soviet Union entered into the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty.93 Under this Treaty, which has not yet
85. Doub & Weiss, supra note 84, at 849.
86. Doub & Weiss, supra note 84, at 850.
87. DUNN, supra note 78, at 60, 130.
88. Id. at 68.
89. See generally, Ronald Reagan, Peace and National Security, 83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 8-10
(April 1983).
90. See generally, G. SEABORG, KENNEDY, KHRUSCHCHEV, AND THE TEST BAN (1981).
91. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
92. Id. at art. I(a)(b).
93. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
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been ratified by the United States, "each Party undertakes to prohibit,
to prevent, and not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon test
having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under its jurisdic-
tion or control beginning March 31, 1976. 
94
Both countries also agree to "limit the number of its under-
ground nuclear weapon tests to a minimum95 . . . [and to] continue
their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the prob-
lem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests."' 96 In
order to provide assurance of compliance with the provisions of the
Treaty, "each Party may use the national technical means of verifica-
tion at its disposal" 97 and agrees to provide data concerning its under-
ground tests. 98
In May 1976, the United States and the Soviet Union entered
into a treaty, which has not yet been ratified by the United States, on
underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNE's).99
There is no essential distinction between the technology of a nuclear
device which would be used as a weapon and the technology of a
nuclear explosive device used for peaceful purposes.1°° The Treaty
permits peaceful nuclear explosions to be performed outside the "geo-
graphical boundaries of test sites specified under the provisions of the
Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests"101
and the "territory of another State at the request of such other
State."1 0
2
The United States and the Soviet Union agreed in the Treaty on
Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes not to carry
out any individual nuclear explosions with a yield exceeding 150 kilo-
publics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, (never signed), July 3, 1974,
U.S. Dep't State, Press Release No. 281 (July 3, 1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 906 (1974).
94. Id. at art. 1(1).
95. Id. at art. 1(2).
96. Id. at art. 1(3).
97. Id. at art. 11(1).
98. Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States Of America and the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, supra note
93.
99. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, U.S. Arms Control &
Disarmament Agency, Pub. No. 871 (May 13, 1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 891 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as Peaceful Purposes Treaty].
100. U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 76, at 171 (1984).
101. Peaceful Purposes Treaty, supra note 99, at art. III(l)(a).
102. Id. at art. III(l)(b).
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tons; 10 3 not to carry out any group explosions (consisting of a number
of individual explosions) with an aggregate yield exceeding 1,500 kilo-
tons; 1° and not to carry out any group explosion with an aggregate
yield exceeding 150 kilotons unless the individual explosions in the
group could be identified and measured by agreed verification proce-
dures. 10 5 The two parties also affirmed their obligations to comply
fully with the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.106 To assure compli-
ance with the provisions of the treaty, each Party may "use national
technical means of verification"'' 0 7 and shall "provide to the other
Party information and access to sites of explosions."108 The Treaty
establishes a Joint Consultive Commission "to promote the objectives
and implementation of the provisions of [the Treaty]."109
Reviewing the impact of the limits on the testing of nuclear
weapons, Robert Johansen notes that the limits on atmospheric test-
ing resulted in a shift to underground testing, but did not limit or
decrease the number of tests being conducted."l0 Johansen also notes
that the 150 kiloton limit is "the size of ten Hiroshima bombs, and
test devices exceeding that amount represent no more than 10 percent
of the Soviet and American tests during the years immediately pre-
ceding the new accord [of 1974]." l Studies also indicated that the
test ban treaties have also limited, but have not eliminated, the release
of radioactive particles into the atmosphere."12
C. Limitations on the Number and Type of Nuclear Weapons
The primary legal mechanism for controlling nuclear weapons
are bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet
Union which limit the number and types of nuclear weapons deployed
by each country. These bilateral treaties are supplemented by meas-
ures designed to prevent the accidental or mistaken resort to nuclear
weapons.
103. Id. at art. III(2)(a).
104. Id. at art. III(2)(b)(2).
105. Id. at art. III(2)(b)(1).
106. Id. at preamble, para. 3.
107. Id. at art. IV(1)(a).
108. Id. at art. IV(1)(b).
109. Id. at art. V(1).
110. R. JOHANSEN, THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE HUMAN INTEREST: AN ANAL-
YSIS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 115 (1980).
111. Id.
112. H. WASSERMAN & N. SOLOMAN, supra note 28, at 58-124.
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The "Hot Line" Agreement' 3 establishes a direct communica-
tions link between the United States and the Soviet Union "to guard
against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons."
' 4
The 1971 "Hot Line" Modernization Agreement established a satel-
lite communications link between the two countries." 5
The superpowers also have signed the Agreement on Measures to
Reduce the Outbreak of Nuclear War" 6 in which each country
agrees:
(1) to maintain and to improve, ... its existing organizational
and technical arrangements to guard against the accidental or un-
authorized use of nuclear weapons under its control;" 17
(2) to notify each other immediately in the event of an accidental,
unauthorized or any other unexplained incident involving a possi-
ble detonation of a nuclear weapon which could create a risk of
outbreak of nuclear war;" 18
(3) to notify each other immediately in the event of detection by
missile warning systems of unidentified objects, or in the event of
signs of interference with these systems . . . if such occurrences
could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war between the two
countries; "19
(4) to notify the other Party in advance of any planned missile
launches if such launches will extend beyond its national territory
in the direction of the other party;
120
(5) In other situations involving unexplained nuclear incidents,
...[to] inform the other Party or request information when, in its
view, this is warranted by the interests of averting the risk of out-
break of nuclear war.' 2'
113. Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications
Link (Hot Line Agreement), June 20, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 825, T.I.A.S. No. 5362, 472 U.N.T.S.
163. See also Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics on Measures to Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communications Link (Hot
Line Modernization Agreement), Sept. 30, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1598, T.I.A.S. No. 7187, 806
U.N.T.S. 402.
114. Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Sept. 30, 1971, 22
U.S.T. 1590, T.I.A.S. No. 7186 [hereinafter cited as Risk Reduction Measures Agreement].
115. Hot Line Modernazation Agreement, supra note 113, at art. I(1) (a).
116. Risk Reduction Measures Agreement, supra note 114, at Preamble.
117. Id. at art. 1.
118. Id. at art. II.
119. Id. at art. III.
120. Id. at art. IV.
121. Id. at art. V.
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At the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union undertook
an additional step towards preventing nuclear war by entering into an
Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. 122 The two countries
agreed that it is "an objective of their policies. . . to remove the dan-
ger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons." 123 The Parties
"agree that they will act in such a manner as to prevent the develop-
ment of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of
their relations, as to avoid military confrontations, and as to exclude
the outbreak of nuclear war between them and between either of the
Parties and other countries." 124 The Parties also agree to "refrain
from the threat or use of force against the other Party, against the
allies of the other Party and against other countries, in circumstances
which may endanger international peace and security."' 125 If, at any
time, a situation appears to present the risk of nuclear war between
the two parties, the United States and the Soviet Union agree to "im-
mediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and make
every effort to avert this risk."126
These mutual pledges of precaution and restraint concerning the
deployment of nuclear weapons are at odds with the two superpowers'
reliance on nuclear weapons as central components of their strategic
arsenals. 127 The effectiveness and credibility of these efforts to limit
the superpowers' use of nuclear weapons depends upon the two coun-
tries' willingness and ability to maintain a stable foreign policy rela-
tionship and overcome the pattern of discord which generally has
characterized their relationship with one another over the last few
decades. 12
8
The major mechanism for maintaining a dialogue between the
superpowers and for limiting the number and type of nuclear weapons
deployed by the two countries has been the bilateral arms talks and
agreements negotiated between the United States and the Soviet
Union at Geneva.
122. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War, June 22, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1478, T.I.A.S. No.
7654.
123. Id. at art. I.
124. Id.
125. Id. at art. II.
126. Id. at art. IV.
127. See, e.g., 2 U.S.-Soviet Regional Talks Set, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1985, at 6, col. 3.
See also supra note 14-15.
128. For the relationship between nuclear weapons strategy and foreign policy, see gener-
ally, L. FREEDMAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY (1983).
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The 1972 Interim Agreement Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain
Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, 129 which expired in 1977 provided, inter alia, that:
The Parties
undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-
based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after
July 1, 1972.130
The Parties
undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light
ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964,
into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed
after that time. 131
The Parties
undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to
the numbers operational and under construction on the date
of signature of th[e] Interim Agreement .... 132
The Parties
[agree to limit the] modernization and replacement of strate-
gic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers .... 133
Each Party
shall use national technical means of verification at its dispo-
sal . . . 134
undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means
of verification of the other Party . . . 135[and] undertakes not
to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verifi-
cation by national technical means of compliance . ... 136
A Standing Consultative Commission was established "to promote
129. The Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504 [hereinafter cited as SALT
I].
130. Id. at art. I. The United States had 1054 ICBM launchers; the Soviet Union 1608.
See THE HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY GROUP, LIVING WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 94 (1983).
131. SALT I, supra note 129, at art. II. The United States had no ICBM launchers; the
Soviet Union had 308. THE HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY GROUP, supra note 130, at 94.
132. SALT I, supra note 129, at art. III. The United States had 656 submarine launched
ballastic missiles (SLBMs) while the Soviet Union had 740 SLBMs. HARVARD NUCLEAR
STUDY GROUP, supra note 130.
133. SALT I, supra note 129, at art. IV.
134. Id. at art. V(1).
135. Id. at art. V(2).
136. Id. at art. V(3).
1986]
206 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J [Vol. 8:183
the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim
Agreement . ",137
A separate agreement limits each side to two anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) systems 138 which are designed to intercept strategic ballistic
missiles in-flight. A comprehensive ABM system is viewed as destabi-
lizing in that it would force each superpower to develop sophisticated
offensive missiles to counter the other side's ABM defense. 139 The
1974 Anti-Ballistic Missile Protocol restricts the superpowers to one
ABM site. 140 Each Party, with advance notice, has the right "to dis-
mantle or destroy its ABM system" and "to deploy an ABM system
or its components in . . . [an] alternative area . . " .141
In 1974, President Gerald Ford and Soviet Party General Secre-
tary Leonid L. Brezhnev reaffirmed:
the great significance that both the United States and the USSR
attach to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. They are con-
vinced that. . . a long term agreement on this question would be a
significant contribution to improving relations between the US and
the USSR, to reducing the danger of war and to enhancing world
peace. 142
The two leaders affirmed their intention to conclude a new arms limi-
tation agreement covering the period from October 1977 through De-
cember 31, 1985.143 The new agreement would have imposed limits
on the aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles, including the
number of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched
missiles each side would be permitted to possess. 1"4
137. Id. at art. VI.
138. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435,
T.I.A.S. No. 7503, and Protocol of 1974, July 3, 1974, 27 U.S.T. 1645, T.I.A.S. No. 8276.
139. See generally ABM: AN EVALUATION OF THE DECISION TO DEPLOY AN ANTI-
BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM (A. Chayes & J. Wiesner eds. 1969).
140. Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3, 1974, 27 U.S.T.
1645, T.I.A.S. No. 8276.
141. Id. at art. II.
142. Joint Statement on Strategic Offensive Arms Issued at Vladivostok, Nov. 24, 1974, 71
DEP'T OF ST. BULL. 879 (1974).
143. Id.
144. Excerpt from "President Ford's News Conference of December 2," 71 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 861 (1974).
The contemplated treaty would provide for:
-a ceiling of 2,400 on the total number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, subma-
rine-launched missiles and heavy bombers.
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Under the unratified SALT II Treaty 45 the two superpowers un-
dertake "to limit strategic offensive arms quantitatively and qualita-
tively, to exercise restraint in the development of new types of
strategic offensive arms, and to adopt other measures provided for in
this Treaty."'146 The Treaty, inter alia, provided for:
An aggregate limit of 2,400 on intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
launchers, heavy bombers and air-to-surface ballistic missiles
(ASBMs). Each side pledges to reduce these arms to a number not to
exceed 2,250 as of January 1, 1981.1
47
An aggregate limit of 1,320 launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and
ASBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry ve-
hicles (MIRVs), and heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capa-
ble of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.
148
An aggregate limit of 1,200 on ICBMs and SLBMs launchers
and on ASBMs equipped with MIRVs.
149
An aggregate limit of 820 ICBM launchers equipped with
MIRVs.150
A prohibition on the construction of additional fixed ICBM
launchers; on the relocation of fixed ICBM launchers; on increasing
the internal volume of ICBM silo launchers by more than thirty-two
percent; and a prohibition on the conversion of ICBM launchers
deployed prior to 1964 into launchers of heavy ICBMs "of types
deployed after that time." 15'
A ban on mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs; and on heavy
SLBMs and on heavy ASBMs.' 52
Permitting the flight-testing or deployment of one new type of
-a limit on the number of missiles armed with multiple warheads (MIRVs) to ap-
proximately 1,320 of 2,400 missiles. Id.
145. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons, June 18, 1979, U.S. DEP'T ST. PUB.
no. 8984, SALT II Agreement, (Selected Documents, No. 12A, June 18, 1979), reprinted in 18
I.L.M. 1138 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SALT II].
146. Id. at art. I.
147. Id. at art. III, 1, 2.
148. Id. at art. V, I.
149. Id. at art. V, 2.
150. Id. at art. V, 3.
151. Id. at art. IV, 1, 2, 3, 4.
152. Id. at art. IX, 1, (d), (e), (0. "Heavy" is defined as a missile whose launch-weight or
throw-weight is "greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-
weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of
this Treaty .... " Id. at art. IX, 1 (e).
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light ICBM. 53 The "new type" of ICBM may carry up to ten reentry
vehicles. 154
A prohibition on the flight-testing or deployment of ICBMs with
a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of
reentry vehicles on ICBMs "of that type which have been flight-tested
as of May 1, 1979."'15
Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or to deploy SLBMs
with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number
of reentry vehicles with which an SLBM of either Party has been
flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, fourteen.
156
Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs with a
number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of re-
entry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flight-
tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, ten.15
7
Each Party undertakes not to deploy at any one time on heavy
bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of
600 kilometers, a number of such cruise missiles which exceeds the
product of twenty-eight and the number of such heavy bombers.
5 8
Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or to deploy ICBMs
which have a launch-weight or throw-weight greater than that of ex-
isting missiles. 1 9
A ban on rapid reload ICBM systems. 160
A ban on certain types of strategic weapons: ballistic missiles
capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers for installation on
waterborne vehicles other than submarines; 16' fixed ballistic or cruise
missile launchers for emplacement on the ocean floor, on the seabed,
or on the beds of internal waters and inland waters; 62 and systems for
placing into Earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other kind of weap-
ons of mass destruction, including fractional orbital missiles. 63
President Carter withdrew the SALT II Treaty from Senate con-
153. Id. at art. IV, 9. A "new" type of ICBM is defined as one "not flight-tested as of May
1, 1979." Id.
154. Id. at art. IV, 11.
155. Id. at art. IV, 10.
156. Id. at art. IV, 12.
157. Id. at art. IV, 13.
158. Id. at art. IV, 14.
159. Id. at art. IV, 7.
160. Id. at art. IV, 5 (c).
161. Id. at art. IX, I (a).
162. Id. at art. IX, I (b).
163. Id. at art. IX, 1 (c).
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sideration following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, as
of 1985, the United States and the Soviet Union both appear to have
respected the terms of the SALT II Treaty. 164
The Reagan administration has adopted the position that the
SALT Treaties have weakened the United States' military position
relative to the Soviet Union. At a March 31, 1982 press conference,
President Reagan observed that "the Soviet Union does have a defi-
nite margin of superiority, enough so that there is a risk and there is
what I have called, as you all know, several times a window of vulner-
ability."' 165 President Reagan warned that as a result of this "window
of vulnerability", that "all the moral values which this country cher-
ishes . . . are fundamentally challenged by a powerful adversary
which does not wish these values to survive."' 166 The Reagan Admin-
istration also questioned whether the Soviets had complied with the
requirements of the SALT treaties.167
President Reagan believed that the United States could not nego-
tiate from weakness and argued that the Soviets only would enter into
meaningful arms negotiations if the United States embarked on arms
build-up which would force the Soviets to choose between either
matching the American nuclear arsenal or entering into negotiations
limiting the arms race. 168 The Reagan Administration took the posi-
tion that any future arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union
should be based upon four principles:
169
164. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, U.S. DEF. POL. 60-61 (3d ed. 1983).
165. News Conference of March 31 (Excerpts), 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. 29 (May 1982).
166. Ronald Reagan, Reducing the Danger of Nuclear Weapons, 83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 1
(May 1983).
167. Id. at 1-2.
168. Ronald Reagan, Arms Control and Reduction, 83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 34, 35 (March
1983).
169. Ronald Reagan, Reducing the Danger of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 166, at 3. The
Reagan Administration's nuclear policy is based on a number of propositions. See S. TAL-
BOTT, THE RUSSIANS AND REAGAN 51, 52 (1984). These propositions are:
1. [Tlhe United States was militarily inferior to the Soviet Union.
2. In the past, arms control had contributed to American military inferiority
and, if continued, would have locked the United States permanently into second
place . ...
3. The best course was to suspend bilateral bargaining and concentrate on uni-
lateral American rearmament.
4. If forced by political expediency to engage in arms control, the United
States must finl a way of pursuing an arms buildup simultaneously, and it must give
priority to the buildup on its own side.
5. [A]rms control must feature reductions, and the deeper the reductions, the
better...
6. The United States must insist on drastic cutbacks in the most modern, pat-
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First, our efforts to control arms should seek reductions on
both sides - significant reductions.
Second, we insist that arms control agreements be equal and
balanced.
Third, arms control agreements must be effectively verifiable.
We cannot gamble with the safety of our people and the people of
the world.
Fourth, we recognize that arms control is not an end in itself
but a vital part of a broad policy designed to strengthen peace and
security.
The Reagan Administration's initial arms control plan was com-
prised of two components. The "zero-option" or "zero-zero plan"
was proposed at the bi-lateral, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Negotiations (IRNF) in Geneva which began on November 30, 1981.
The plan would have delayed United States deployment of 572 Per-
shing II and Cruise missiles in NATO countries in return for a Soviet
agreement to dismantle its SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles which were
targeted at Western European countries. 170 The "zero-option" plan
was modified on March 30, 1983 so as to require the United States
and the Soviet Union to have an equal number of intermediate-range
missiles on a "global basis."' 7 1 The latter phrase was designed to in-
clude the Soviet missiles targeted at China and Japan in the arms
agreement. 72 The Soviets left the intermediate-range missile negotia-
tions in November 1983 when the United States initiated the deploy-
ment of Pershing and Cruise missiles in Western Europe.
73
In June 1982 representatives of the two countries met at Geneva
to begin what the Reagan Administration termed the Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks (START). 74 The Soviets rejected the Reagan Ad-
ministration's proposal to reduce both sides' total ballistic missile
warheads by roughly one-third to approximately 5,000 ballistic mis-
sile warheads. No more than one-half of these 5,000 warheads were
ent Soviet weapons already ployed; no comparable reductions should be considered
in existing American forces.
Id.
170. Ronald Reagan, U.S. Program for Peace and Arms Control, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL. 10,
11, 13 (Dec. 1981).
171. Ronald Reagan, President's Statement. March 30, 1983, in Reducing the Danger of
Nuclear Arms, supra note 166, at 3.
172. Id.
173. S. TALBOTT, DEADLY GAMBITS: THi REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE STALE-
MATE IN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL 185-305 (1984).
174. Ronald Reagan, President Reagan Visits Europe, 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. 34, 36 (July
1982).
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to be deployed on land-based missiles. 175
In the second phase of its START initiative, the Reagan Admin-
istration proposed that equal ceilings be placed on the throw-weight
of the two countries' nuclear arsenals. This ceiling was to be placed at
a level below the existing United States aggregate throw-weight.
176
The START Talks were abandoned when the Soviets left Geneva in
protest over the United States' stationing of Pershing II missiles in
Western Europe.
177
The Reagan START proposal may have been unrealistic in that
it would have required the Soviet Union to restructure its strategic
arsenal so as to de-emphasize the land-based component of its nuclear
triad. Soviet ICBMs carry approximately seventy percent of the So-
viet strategic warheads and account for more than eighty percent of
the Soviet nuclear arsenal.
17
On January 8, 1985, the United States and the Soviet Union
agreed to reopen arms negotiations and to consider limitations on in-
termediate, strategic and on space-based nuclear weapons.179 The pos-
sibility of a successful arms agreement, however, appears to be
jeopardized by President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star
Wars" Plan) which calls for the development of a defensive missile
system capable of intercepting incoming offensive missiles. 80
The effectiveness of arms control negotiations and agreements
may be judged by the extent to which they have slowed, stopped or
have reversed the arms race. "By that standard, arms control has
failed. Several thousand diplomatic meetings on armaments between
the United States and the Soviet Union over the past thirty-five years
have failed to eliminate a single weapon or to reduce the willingness of
governments to use military power in diplomacy and combat."' 18 1
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. S. TALBOTr, supra note 173, at 330-42.
178. See generally, R. SCHEER, WITH ENOUGH SHOVELS: REAGAN, BUSH AND NUCLEAR
WAR 165-68, n.1 (1983). The Reagan proposal required that nuclear warheads be distributed
equally between SLBMs and ICBMs. Soviet ICBM warheads currently outnumber their
SLBM warheads by roughly four-to-one and the Reagan initiative would necessitate that the
Soviets destroy approximately one-half of their MIRVs and ICBMs. The Reagan proposal did
not address strategic advantage. Id. at 167-68.
179. U.S.-Soviet Parley on Arms Control Begins in Geneva, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19,1985, at 1,
col. 1; Reagan Names Three Delegates to Arms Talks, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1985, at 1, col. 2
180. Ronald Reagan, supra note 89, at 8, 14. See generally, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS, supra note 75; US Will Hold Out For a Soviet Shift in Talks on Arms, N.Y.
Times, June 2, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
181. Johansen, SALT II. A Symptom of the Arms Race, in TOWARD NUCLEAR DISARMA-
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Robert C. Johansen compares attempting to halt the arms race
through negotiations with "attempting to dam a wide stream by drop-
ping one large rock in its middle. No water will pass through the
space actually displaced by the rock, but the stress will flow around it
without decreasing its volume by increasing its speed on both sides of
the rock."
' 18 2
The two superpowers arguably do not want to limit their ability
to exercise military force and do not want to place themselves in an
inferior military position relative to one another. As a result, bilateral
arms negotiations have proven unsuccessful in curbing nuclear arms
development and have tended to legitimate the level and type of weap-
ons which the two superpowers would have developed had no agree-
ment been reached.183 Johansen, with perhaps some exaggeration,
notes that:
[I]f there had been no arms control negotiations, it would have
been clearer to Congress and the public that they were paying for
an open-ended arms race, whereas during SALT many people were
led to believe that they were supporting limited arms increments
for the purpose of facilitating arms control . . . in the absence of
arms negotiations, the assumption that advanced technology
should be exploited for new weapons could have been challenged
more directly. The justification for weapons programs, at the least,
would then have had to rest on military rather than on arms con-
trol needs.18 4
In order to compensate for the limited ability of bilateral arms
control agreements to control the nuclear arms race, various unilat-
eral policies have been proposed to limit nuclear weapons and to initi-
ate a process of meaningful arms reduction. These policies include a
mutual "build-down" of nuclear weapons; 8 5 a "freeze" on nuclear
weapons development and deployment; 186 a policy of "no first use" of
MENT AND GLOBAL SECURITY: A SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES (B. Weston ed. 1984) [here-
inafter cited as B. Weston].
182. R. JOHANSEN, supra note I10, at 55.
183. B. Weston, supra note 181, at 94-103.
184. R. JOHANSEN, supra note 110, at 61.
185. Frye, Strategic Build-Down: A Context for Restraint, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 293 (1983).
The build-down principle states that no new weapons system should be deployed unless a
larger number of weapons are destroyed. Id.
186. See generally, E. KENNEDY & M. HATFIELD, supra note 5, at 169. The original
freeze is to be on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and
other delivery systems. Following a mutual and verifiable freeze, the United States and the
Soviet Union would be required to pursue mutual and verifiable reductions in nuclear war-
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nuclear weapons;18 7 a limitation on the number of nuclear weapons to
that level which, if deployed, would avert environmental catastro-
phe; 8 8 and the creation of a nuclear "free zone" in Europe in order to
reduce the risk that nuclear weapons will be used in the event of a
conventional conflict. 18
9
These proposals do not alter the superpowers' reliance on nuclear
weapons as central components of their defense forces.' 90 Jonathan
Schell observes that although nuclear weapons ultimately should be
prohibited, international efforts in the meantime should be devoted to
"interim measures" designed to avert the possibility of an imminent
nuclear disaster: 19 1
Today, mankind is like a person who lies bleeding to death on the
street after an accident. Eventually, this person will require major
surgery. But right now he needs to be rushed to the hospital in an
ambulance, and given first aid on the way. It is pointless to say at
this moment, This person doesn't need an ambulance, he needs ma-
jor surgery. The passage from our nuclear-armed world to a nu-
clear-weaponless world would be that ambulance ride. Once the
life of mankind is out of immediate danger, we will have the time
- we will have have won it for ourselves - to address the radical
and sweeping measures of global political renovation which alone
can fully deliver us from the evil.
192
Despite the necessity of focusing on short-run measures to halt
the nuclear arms race, the fact remains that so long as nuclear arms
are an accepted means of national defense that the human race is
threatened with potential extinction, or, at the very least, with the
destruction of contemporary global society. In the next portion of this
heads, missiles and other delivery systems, through annual percentage reductions or other
effective means. See generally, Id.
187. Bundy, Kennan, McNamara and Smith, Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance,
60 FOREIGN AFF. 753 (1981). The "no first use" proposal would establish as United States
strategic doctrine a policy of being "the first . . . to use nuclear weapons to defend against
aggression in Europe." Id. at 754.
188. Sagan, supra note 41.
189. McNamara, The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions,
62 FOREIGN AFF. 59, 78, 79 (1983).
190. See generally, J. SCHELL, THE ABOLITION 139 (1984). Schell proposes a "weaponless
deterrence" which requires countries to disarm while retaining the capacity to rearm them-
selves in the event that a nuclear attack appears imminent. See also, Kahn, Nuclear Prolifera-
tion and Rules of Retaliation, 76 YALE L.J. 77 (1966) (calls for the creation of a multilateral
nuclear force which would retaliate against any nation resorting to the use of nuclear
weapons).
191. SCHELL, supra note 190, at 132-33.
192. Id.
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Article it is argued that rather than viewing nuclear weapons as in-
strumentalities that should be or are capable of being regulated under
bilateral and multilateral agreements, that the production, testing,
possession, threat to use or use of nuclear weapons should be consid-
ered as violative of international criminal law. This shift in the per-
ception and legal status of nuclear weapons would result in the
production, testing, possession, threat to use or use of nuclear weap-
ons being considered criminal conduct rather than being considered
an exercise of state sovereignty.
93
V. THE LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Most international law scholars appear to have concluded that
nuclear weapons are inevitable, necessary and legal.194
The case for the legality of nuclear weapons is a negative one -
any act which is not explicitly prohibited under international law by
implication is permitted. Eugene Rostow's remarks reflect this point-
of-view:
In regard to the legality of nuclear weapons, these have not been
singled out by nations as illegal in treaties or other formal docu-
ments of international law. The weapon has been the subject of
treaties which deal with the regulation of the weapon but which do
not outlaw it as such. We must conclude that the possible use of
nuclear weapons . . . remains legal . . . .195
McDougal and Schlei concur in Rostow's analysis. They state:
There is no express prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons in
either customary or conventional international law, and the argu-
ment for prohibition is derived by "analogy" from prescriptions
with respect to poisonous gas and arms and other weapons causing
disproportionate suffering. In international law as in municipal
law, however, analogies in prescription and decisions are relevant
only for the policies which infuse them. 196
193. But see THE HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY GROUP, supra note 130, at 18-19. "The
danger of focusing on utopian objectives is that they can take attention away from practical
and positive steps[;] . . . incremental steps matter." Id.
194. O'Brien, Legitimate Military Necessity In Nuclear War, 2 Y.B. WORLD POLITY 35,
98, 99 (1960).
195. E. Rostow, Remarks, 75th Annual Meeting, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. Assoc.
INT'L L. 25, 26 (April 22-24, 1982) (panel on Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear War). See
generally The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 10 (Judgment of
Sept. 7); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
196. McDougal and Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for
Security, 64 YALE L.J. 649, 689 (1955).
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Other scholars point out that the legality of nuclear weapons
must be evaluated in light of the threat posed by the Soviet Union to
the United States. For example:
For our contemporary world, the real question to be answered by
the universal conscience of mankind is not, "Is nuclear warfare
permitted?" More properly there are two elements in the question,
ends as well as means. "Is nuclear warfare as a means of resisting
Communism permitted?" Or . . . "Is nuclear warfare against
Communist armed attack a legitimate military necessity?"'' 97
Nuclear weapons, it is argued, have rendered the law of war and
any discussion of restraints on weaponry obsolete. William V.
O'Brien argues:
that the iron-clad principle of inviolability of so-called non-com-
batants and non-military objectives is no longer valid because both
its philosophical and material bases have ceased to exist while
practice has contravened its prescription so regularly that a definite
change in customary international law has taken place. 198
United States Army Field Manual, 27-10, adopts the majority
view that nuclear weapons are legal: "The use of explosive 'atomic
weapons,' whether by air, sea, or land forces, cannot as such be re-
garded as violative of international law in the absence of any custom-
ary rule of international law or international convention restricting
their employment."'' 99
Professor Richard Falk, in criticizing the view that nuclear
weapons are legal, argues that it:
seems ludicrous to extend the reasoning of the Lotus case of 1927
[that what is not prohibited under international law is permitted],
developed to assess a very narrow question of jusisprudential com-
petency in a criminal negligence controversy arising out of a colli-
sion on the high seas, to the drastically different circumstances
surrounding the consideration of the legal status of nuclear weap-
ons. For one thing, on a jurisprudential level, the issue of whether
or not a given activity is prohibited by pre-existing rules is partly a
197. O'Brien, supra note 194, at 105.
198. Id. at 84.
199. Bright, Nuclear Weapons as a Lawful Means of Warfare, 30 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2, n.1
(1965), citing U.S. Dep't of Army Field Manual, no. 27-10, The Law Of Land Warfare (1956).
An unpublished annotation to Field Manual no. 27-10 explains that "it [the Atom Bomb] has
been used, it still exists, that the major powers are practically committed to use it in a future
war, and that it has been accepted to the extent that it is spoken of in the context of disarma-
ment rather than illegality." Id. at 1-2.
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matter of how general is the level of appraisal chosen. For in-
stance, while nuclear weapons are not the explicit subject of any
agreement binding nuclear weapons states, the main instruments of
the pre-existing laws of land warfare prohibit all methods of war-
fare having the characteristics associated with contemplated uses
of nuclear weapons.
2° °
Falk also points out that the use of the Lotus doctrine to establish
the legality of nuclear weapons fails to recognize the dynamic nature
of the law of war as reflected in the language of the Martens Clause of
the Preamble to the Hague Convention (IV). 2 o° The Martens Clause
provides that:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High
Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not in-
cluded in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and bel-
ligerents remain under the protection and empire of international
law, as they result from the usages established between civilized
nations, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public
conscience.
20 2
Professor Falk concludes that, based on the Martens Clause,
the overwhelming normative consensus now operative in interna-
tional society would legally condemn all contemplated roles for nu-
clear weapons, except roles for nuclear weapons, except
'possession', as a hedge against nuclear blackmail; not even a retali-
atory use of nuclear weapons could be easily reconciled with most
interpretations of the laws of war, given the properties of the weap-
onry and the difficulty of reconciling any actual use with such prin-
ciples as 'necessity', 'proportionality', 'discrimination' and
'humanity'.
20 3
200. Falk, Towards a Legal Regime for Nuclear Weapons, 28 McGILL L.J. 519, 526 (1983)
(explanatory material added).
201. Id. at 527-28.
202. Hague Convention (no. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18
October 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631, Preamble.
203. Falk, supra note 200 at 527-28. The Geneva Conventions affirm that the laws of war
do draw their authority from the moral consensus of the community as well as from positive
law. Article 63 (4) of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field provides:
The denunciation shall have effect only in respect of the denouncing Power. It shall
in no way impair the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound
to fulfill by virtue of the principles of the law of nations as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the
public conscience.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. See also,
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Various United Nations resolutions provide "evidence of a global
normative consensus which considers the threat of use or use of nu-
clear weapons as a contradiction to the fundamental humanitarian
principles upon which the international laws of war are founded." 2°4
General Assembly Resolution 1653, inter alia, declares that "the use
of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter
and aims of the United Nations and as such, a direct violation of the
Charter of the United Nations. '20 5
Other instruments, while not directly condemning the use of nu-
clear weapons, urge that nation-states pursue disarmament. Article
VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferaton Treaty, for instance, provides
that:
[e]ach of the Parties to the Treaty undertake to pursue negotiation
in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nu-
clear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and
on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control. 20 6
Additional support for Falk's contention that nuclear weapons
are contrary to the prevailing global normative consensus is found in
the American Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter on War and Peace,
The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, in which
the Bishops criticize the nuclear arms race and conclude that it is
necessary to "move . . . in a direction, toward a national policy and
Article 62 (4), Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363,
75 U.N.T.S. 85; Article 142 (4), Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 6
U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Article 158 (4), Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons In Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No.
3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
[Article one, paragraph two of Protocol I to the Geneva Convention provides that:]
In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians
and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of inter-
national law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and
from dictates of public conscience.
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (relating to the protection
of victims of international armed conflicts) (Protocol I) June 8, 1977. U.N. Doc. A/32/144,
Annex 1, (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter cited as Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions].
204. Meyrowitz, The Laws of War and Nuclear Weapons, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 227,
255 (1983).
205. G.A. Res. 1653 (XVI), 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1972). For an enumeration of General Assembly resolutions condemning nuclear weapons
see Feinrider, International Law as Law of the Land.- Another Constitutional Constraint on Use
of Nuclear Weapons, 7 NOVA L. J. 103, 116, n. 46 (1982).
206. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 79.
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an international system which more adequately reflect the values and
vision of the Kingdom of God.
' '207
The acceptance of the legality of nuclear weapons is an implicit
admission that the law of war has been rendered obsolete. Law,
rather than limiting States' use of armed force, would be defined by
the self-interest of powerful states. The Lawyers Committee On Nu-
clear Policy concludes that:
[I]f the goals of the law of war - to set limits on permissible vio-
lence - is to be realized to any serious degree, and if the funda-
mental principles of humanity are to be of continuing relevance to
their interpretation, then it must be concluded that any threat of
use of nuclear weapons is illegal. . . . As the law of war embody
the minimum demands of decency, exempting nuclear weapons
from that body of laws would be abandoning even this minimum
standard.
2 0 8
The starting-point for a discussion of the (il)legality of nuclear
weapons is the developing area of international criminal law.
A. International Criminal Law
Since 1947, the United Nations has been in the process of draft-
ing a Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.
20 9
207. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Pastoral Letter On War and Peace - The
Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, 123, 142, quoted in B. Weston, supra
note 181. The entire Pastoral is reprinted in J. CASTELLI, THE BISHOPS AND THE BOMB
(1983).
208. Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, Statement on the Illegality of Nuclear Weap-
ons, 146, 150 quoted in B. Weston, supra note 181. Article 36 of Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions, supra note 203, affirms the relevance of international law to means or methods of
warfare:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or meth-
ods of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine
whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this
Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting
Party.
209. Ferencz, The Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 75
AM J. INT'L L. 674 (1981).
The International Law Commission's initial draft is contained in U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/25
(1950), reprinted in (1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 274. Nine international crimes were
listed in the draft: aggressive war; invasion by armed groups; fomenting external civil strife;
fomenting external organized terrorism; illegal weapons trafficking; violating arms limitation
treaties; illegal annexation; hostile acts directed against national, ethnic, racial and religious
groups; and violation of laws and customs of war. Id. at n.3.
The standard works on international criminal law include: 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda ed. 1973); 2
A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: JURISDICTION AND COOPERATION ( M.
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During the past 125 years over "100 treaties and conventions have
been promulgated dealing with almost 30 different subjects relating to
criminal law in an international context. '210
There is no consensus as to what conduct should be incorporated
into an international criminal code. 21 1 Professor Cherif Bassiouni has
proposed four criteria for determining the scope of a Code of Offenses
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind:
(1) existing international conventions which consider the act in
question an international crime; (2) recognition under customary
international law that such conduct constitutes an international
crime; (3) recognition under general principles of international law
that such conduct is or should be deemed violative of international
law and about which there is a pending draft convention before the
United Nations; and (4) prohibition of such conduct by an interna-
tional convention though not specifically stating that it constitutes
an international crime and which is also recognized in the writings
of scholars as such.
212
Bassiouni suggests that, in addition to meeting these broad legal crite-
ria, an act must either "rise to the level where it constitutes an offense
against the world community delictojus gentium or the commission of
the act must affect the interests of more than one state. '213
Arguably, no act threatens "the interests and security of all re-
sponsible members of the international community" to the same ex-
tent as do nuclear weapons.214 However, as Professor Weston has
noted in reference to the existing international instruments which ex-
plicitly address nuclear weapons, "it scarcely can be said that these
Bassiouni & N. Nanda ed. 1973); Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal
Law, 3 CURRENT L. PROB. 263 (1950); Wright, The Scope of International Criminal Law: A
Conceptual Framework 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 561 (1975).
210. Friedlander, The Foundations of International Criminal Law: A Present Day Inquiry,
15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 13, 17 (1983).
211. Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law, 15
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 27, 28 (1983). Bassiouni would include:
aggression, war crimes, unlawful use of weapons, crimes against humanity, genocide,
apartheid, slavery and slave-related practices, torture, unlawful medical experimenta-
tion; piracy, hijacking, kidnapping of diplomats, taking of civilian hostages, unlawful
use of the mails, drug offenses, falsification and counterfeiting, theft of archeological
and national treasures, bribery of public officials, interference with submarine cables,
and international traffic in obscene publications.
Id.
212. Id. at 28.
213. Id. at 28-29.
214. Hassan, The Theoretical Basis of Punishment in International Criminal Law, 15 CASE
W. RES. J. INrr'L L. 39, 56 (1983).
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expressions of legal viewpoint, although certainly evidentiary of cus-
tomary legal expectation, are themselves dispositive . . . Explicit
content does not automatically spell legal prescription, however wise
the content communication may be."'215 The Lawyers' Committee
analysis concludes that "global survivability is so basic a moral imper-
ative that the prohibition [of nuclear weapons] can be reasonably in-
ferred from the existing laws of war. ' 216 It is the general principles of
the law of war upon which the argument that nuclear weapons are
illegal can most persuasively be based.
B. The Existing Law of War and Nuclear Weapons
An analysis of the humanitarian law of war suggests that nuclear
weapons are incompatible with the legal limitation on the damage and
destruction which is associated with armed conflict.
1. Unnecessary suffering
Article 22 of the Annex to the Hague Regulations states that
"the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited. ' 21 7 Article 23(e) adds that "it is especially forbidden . . .
[t]o employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnec-
cessary suffering.
'218
The Declaration of St. Petersburg emphasizes "that the only le-
gitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish during
war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy. . . [and that] this
object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly
215. Weston, Nuclear Weapons Versus International Law: A Contextual Reassessment 28
McGILL L.J. 542, 553 (1983). A Tokyo District Court concluded that the United States
bombings of Hiroshima-Nagasaki violated international law. See The Shimoda Case, Judge-
ment of 7 December 1963, District Court of Tokyo, reprinted in (1964) JAP. ANN. INT'L L.
212. See generally Falk, The Shimoda Case: A Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks upon
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 759 (1965); Paust, The Nuclear Decision in World
War II- Truman's Ending and Avoidance of War, 8 INT'L LAW. 160 (1974).
216. Lawyers' Committee, supra note 208, at 146, 150.
217. Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the 1909 Hague Convention (No. IV)
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No.
539, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter cited as Hague Rules]. See also, Convention On Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Ex-
cessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Apr. 10, 1981, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
9515 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1523, 1524 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Conventional
Weapons Convention]; Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 203, at
art. 35; Hague Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare, Feb. 22, 1922, Articles 22-26 [never in force],
reprinted in 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 245, 250-52 (supp.).
218. Hague Rules, supra note 217, at I Bevans 648.
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aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death
inevitable. "1219
Suffering and injury are inherent in armed conflict. However, it
"is less the fact of devastation and suffering than the needlessness, the
superfluity, the disproportionality of harm relative to military result
that is determinative of illegality. ' 220 The limits on the destructive-
ness of warfare have been conceptualized as being comprised of the
principles of humanity, military necessity and proportionality.
-The principle of humanity requires that war or hostilities
should be conducted with the least possible destruction to human and
material values and with the least possible expenditure of time, life
and physical resources.
221
-The principle of military necessity limits destruction to that
necessary for obtaining lawful military objectives. 222
-The principle of proportionality requires that the loss of life
must be in proportion to the value of the military objectives to be
obtained. 2
23
The consideration of these limiting principles "must take place
before a specific weapon is employed. '' 224
Nuclear weapons arguably are inherently incapable of being "di-
rected at a specific military objective. . . and consequently,. . . are
of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects
without distinction. ' ' 225 Elliot L. Meyrowitz concludes that:
[T]he use of nuclear weapons in populated areas would result in
the indiscriminate and massive slaughter of civilians. Moreover,
even if nuclear weapons were used only against an enemy's strate-
gic nuclear forces, the annihilation and extermination of the civil-
ian population would be an inevitable by-product. As the
experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki amply demonstrate, the ef-
219. Declaration Renouncing the Use in Time of War of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Parry's T.S. 297, 298 (Declaration of St. Petersburg)
(author's trans.).
220. Weston, supra note 215, at 555.
221. Lee, The United States' Nuclear First Strike Position: A Legal Appraisal of Its Ramifi-
cations, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 508, 515 (1977).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 516. J. PICTET, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
52, 54, 55 (1966) refers to these principles as ratione personae (attacks limited to combatants);
ratione loci (attacks limited to military objectives); and ratione conditionis (prohibition of at-
tacks likely to cause excessive suffering).
224. Id. at 516.
225. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 203, at art.
5 1(4)(a),(b),(c).
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fects of nuclear weapons because of their very awesome nature,
cannot be limited to military targets. Consequently, the use of nu-
clear weapons would result in the commission of war crimes on an
enormous scale. 226
The use of nuclear weapons, unavoidably, would result in the
destruction of peoples of a particluar nationality, and the Lawyers'
Committee On Nuclear Policy concludes that "the threat of nuclear
weapons toward this end would violate at least the spirit of the Geno-
cide Convention of 1948 - which make the destruction of groups on
racial, religious or nationality grounds, an international crime. '227
2. The prohibition of specific weapons
The United Nations has recognized that the development of
weapons systems "that may cause unnecessary suffering or are indis-
criminate call urgently for efforts by Governments to seek, through
possible legal means, the prohibition or restriction of the use of such
weapons and. . through measures of disarmament, the elimination
of specific weapons that are especially cruel or indiscriminate. '228
The use of various weapons which potentially may create indis-
criminate or unnecessary suffering has been legally limited or prohib-
ited. It is prohibited, for instance, to use "any weapon the primary
effect of which is to injure by fragments which in the human body
escape detection by X-rays. ' 229
Land-mines, "booby-traps and manually-employed munitions
and devices designed to kill, injure or damage, and which are actuated
by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time, ' 230 may not
be directed "against the civilian population as such or against individ-
ual civilians."' 23' The "indiscriminate use" of such weapons is also
prohibited. 232 Incendiary weapons may not be used against "individ-
ual civilians or civilian objects . . . any military objective located
within a concentration of civilians. . . forests or other kinds of plant
226. Meyrowitz, Nuclear Weapons Policy: The Ultimate Tyranny, 7 NOVA L.J. 93, 98
(1982).
227. Lawyers' Committee, supra note 208, at 149.
228. G.A. Res. 3076, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 15, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
229. See Conventioanl Weapons Convention, supra note 217, at Protocol on Non-Detact-
able Fragments (Protocol I).
230. Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 217, at Protocol II, Protocol on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, art. 2(3).
231. Id. at art. 3(2).
232. Id. at art. 3(3).
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cover .... '233 The United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
called upon "all Governments to exercise the utmost care in the de-
velopment of small-calibre weapon systems, so as to avoid an unneces-
sary escalation of the injurious effects of such systems. '234
The prohibition and limitation on the use of these weapons lends
credibility to the argument that nuclear weapons, with their vast de-
structive potential, are prohibited. The Lawyers' Committee on Nu-
clear Policy points out that "to assume the legality of a weapon with
the distinct capability to terrorize and to destroy an entire civilian
population would make meaningless the entire effort to limit combat
through the laws of war. '235
3. Poisonous gas
Arguably, the use of nuclear weapons would be barred by the
prohibition on the use of poisonous gas. Article 23(a) of the Hague
Regulations provides that "it is especially forbidden . . . to employ
poison or poisoned arms. ' 236 Various scholars have argued that radi-
ation constitutes a poison based upon the internal effects which radia-
tion produces in the human body, such as genetic damage.237
233. Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 217, at Protocol III, Protocol on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, art. 2.
234. Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 217, at Appendix E, Resolution On
Small-Calibre Weapon Systems, para. 6.
235. Lawyers' Committee, supra note 208, at 149.
236. Hague Rules, supra note 217, at Article 23 (a). But see O'Brien, Legitimate Military
Necessity In Nuclear War, 2 Y.B. W. POLITY 35, 89 (1960) (O'Brien argues that this provision
"seems clearly to be concerned with the poisoning of individuals in the manner of the Italian
Renaissance or the contamination of food or water.").
237. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONs 27 (1968); N.
SINGH, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 156-60 (1959). Bright, Nuclear
Weapons as a Lawful Means of Warfare, 30 MIL. L. REV. 1, 17, 18 (1961) (distinguishes
between varieties of radiation, one type of which does not constitute poison). Bright explains
that:
Initial nuclear radiation is an invisible traveler through the air. It is composed not of
elements or substances, but principally of neutrons and gamma rays, neither of which
can be called a substance. Just as its name connotes, initial nuclear radiation is a
form of radiation, just as heat and light are, and, having no chemical structural for-
mation, cannot be construed as an agent or as a poison.
Residual nuclear radiation, on the other hand, particularly radioactive fallout,
consists of many solid particles of varying sizes, shapes and elements. Fallout is
further divided into two categories: early and delayed. The early fallout consists of
the particles reaching the earth within twenty-four hours after the explosion, whereas
the delayed fallout is composed of the very fine particles present in the radioactive
cloud which ultimately reach the ground more than twenty-four hours after the deto-
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Professor Schwarzenberger defines poison as "any substance that
when introduced into, or absorbed by, a living organism destroys life
or injures health. '238  He concludes that "a fairly strong case can be
made for the assimilation of radiation and radioactive fallout to
poison. ' 239 Professor Singh, relying on the same definition of poison,
concludes that both initial radiation and fallout constitute poison
within the meaning of Article 23(a). 240 He argues that "all atomic
and thermo-nuclear devices, . . . insofar as they result in neutrons,
gamma rays and radioactive fallout in large or small quantities, would
produce contamination of air and earth, and hence run contrary to
the recognized laws of war," regardless of the relative proportion of
nuclear radiation, compared to the effects of blast and heat.241
Meyrowitz concludes that, "[h]ence, because nuclear weapons
cause radioactive fallout that contaminates people, property and the
environment, the effect of such contamination seems sufficiently
analogous to the effect of a poison or poisoned weapon. Thus, nuclear
weapons should fall within the prohibition of Article 23(a).
' 242
Professor Weston concludes that
all nuclear weapons now deployed or planned .. manifest radia-
tion effects that for all intents and purposes are the same as those
that result from poison gas and bacteriological means of warfare;
and, in any event, the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol is so comprehen-
sive in its prohibition that it may be said to dictate the nonuse of
nuclear weapons altogether .... 243
nation of the weapon. The principle hazards from early fallout are from exposure of
the body to gamma rays from sources outside the body and from beta particles which
come directly in contact with the skin, causing bums. This type of injury results
from radiation, just as initial radiation, emanating from agents outside the body, not
from the introduction of a radioactive agent into an organism of the body. Conse-
quently, early fallout does not come under the definition of poison.
Id.
For a summary of the debate as to whether nuclear radiation constitutes "poison," see id.
at 20.
238. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 237, at 27.
239. Id. at 35.
240. N. SINGH, supra note 237.
241. Id. at 160.
242. Meyrowitz, supra note 200, at 235-37.
243. Weston, supra note 3, at 5. The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiat-
ing, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (the Geneva Gas
Protocol), inter alia, prohibits "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of
all analogous liquids, materials or devices. ... The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use
of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June
17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 575, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Gas
Protocol]. Castren, The Illegality of Nuclear Weapons, 1971 TOLEDO L. REV. 89, 95 (con-
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4. The protection of non-combatants
Professor Jordan Paust notes that it is a
generally recognized rule of international law that civilians must
not be made the object of attack directed exclusively against them.
Similarly, it was recognized that a distinction must be made at all
times between combatants and non-combatants, that non-combat-
ants cannot be made the object of attack, that such peremptory
norms also prohibit the intentional terrorization of the civilian
population or the intentional use of a strategy which produces ter-
ror that is not "incidental" to lawful combat operations. 244
The Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions provide
comprehensive protections for non-combatants. Article 57(1) of Pro-
tocol I provides that "in the conduct of military operations, constant
care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civil-
ian objects. ' 245 Article 57(2)(a) states that those who plan or decide
upon an attack shall:
246
(i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be at-
tacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects... 247
(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and meth-
ods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to mini-
mizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects;
248
(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be ex-
pected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civil-
ians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated. 249
(b) an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes appar-
ent that the objective is not a military one . . . or that the
attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life
250
cludes that the "general wording" of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol "seems to indicate that
the drafters wanted to eliminate all future weapons and to avoid loopholes .... ).
244. Paust, Controlling Prohibited Weapons and the Illegal Use of Permitted Weapons, 28
MCGILL L.J. 609, 612 (1983).
245. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention, supra note 203, at art. 57(1).
246. Id. at art. 57(2)(a).
247. Id. at art. 57(2)(a)(i).
248. Id. at art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
249. Id. at art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
250. Id. at art. 57(2)(b).
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3. When a choice is possible between several military objectives
for obtaining a similar military advantage; the objective to be
selected shall be that the attack on which may be expected to
cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian
objects.
251
5. No provision of this article may be construed as authorizing
any attacks aginst the civilian population, civilians or civilian
objects.252
The use of nuclear weapons inevitably would violate the prescrip-
tion against injuring non-combatants. Meyrowitz notes that:
[T]he use of strategic nuclear weapons in populated areas would
result in the indiscriminate and massive destruction of the civilian
population . . . . If the stated threat and potential objective of
nuclear weapons is the destruction of the enemy State - which is
the central premise of assured destruction - then the terrorization
of the civilian population is an inevitable by-product, and a partial
annihilation or extermination of that population would likely re-
sult if nuclear weapons were used. In view of the capacity of such
weapons to terrorize and destroy a civilian population, recognition
of the legality of nuclear weapons would virtually eliminate the
entire effort to constrain this mode of combat - at least in large-
scale warfare - by means of the laws of war.253
In addition, the use of nuclear weapons would illegally "attack,
destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival
of the civilian population, such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas . . .
crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irriga-
tion works .... -254 Nuclear weapons also would cause indirect
harm to civilians by creating environmental damage in violation of
Article 35(3) of the 1977 Geneva Protocol Additional which provides
that "it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which
251. Id. at art. 57(3).
252. Id. at art. 57(5).
253. Meyrowitz, supra note 1, at 240-41.
254. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 203, at art. 54(2) (empha-
sis added). Article 54(2) provides:
It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable
to the survival of the civilian population, such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for
the production of food stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and sup-
plies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their suste-
nance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive,
whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other
motive.
Id. See also arts. 52, 54(3)(4)(5), 56, 57, 58.
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are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the natural environment.
'255
In summary, a nuclear exchange would make the panoply of
human rights protections provided to individuals under international
law meaningless. Professor Richard Bilder notes that:
Both human rights and humitarian law are based on the idea that
the individual is unique and entitled to respect; that the individ-
ual's life and dignity are valuable. Nuclear strategy incorporates a
view of the individual as irrelevant and expendable, an abstract sta-
tistic. Human beings as persons have no place in the jargon of nu-
clear destruction, only megadeaths count. If a few officials are still
free, by pushing a button, to decree the annihilation of millions of
individuals or of an entire nation, then human rights have little
meaning, then respect for individual worth and dignity is ab-
sent. . . . Neither human rights nor humanitarian law will be rel-
evant in a post-holocaust world.
2 56
The damage caused by the large-scale use of nuclear weapons
may extend beyond the target State. The use of nuclear weapons
likely would "wreak havoc and destruction among the populations of
neutral States outside the theater of war which would be affected by
nuclear weapons as if the States were located in the combat zone.
' 25 7
The injury to non-combatants of neutral States, in the view of Profes-
sor Singh, "must be considered as a violation of international law and,
255. Id. at art. 35(3). See also art. 55; Declaration of the United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment, in Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 48/14 and Corr. 1, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972). Princi-
ples 2 and 26 read:
Principle 2. The natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora
and fauna and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems must be safe-
guarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning or
management, as appropriate.
Principle 26. Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weap-
ons and all other means of mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt
agreement, in the relevant international organs, on the elimination and complete de-
struction of such weapons.
Id. Professor Weston observes that "it probably is correct to say that the prohibition is in at
least the incipient stage of becoming law, and certainly is a guide to desired conduct." Weston,
supra note 214, at 557.
256. Bilder, Distinguishing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: The Issue of Nuclear
Weapons, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 959, 961 (1971). See also, Sajoo, Human Rights Perspectives on
the Arms Race, 28 MCGILL L.J. 628 (1983); Nanda, Nuclear Weapons and the Right to Peace
Under International Law, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'I. L. 283 (1983); R. LIFTON AND R. FALK.
INDEFENSIBLE WEAPONS: THE POI.ITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CASE AGAINST NUCLEAR-
ISM 3-125 (1982).
257. Meyrowitz, supra note 204, at 241.
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if it involves the killing of innocent neutrals, a clear war crime. ' 25 8
Professor Castren summarizes the legal arguments against the
use of nuclear weapons:
Thus, we have a conflict with some of the most important princi-
ples of the laws of war, such as the upholding of the difference
between soldiers and civilians and military and non-military ob-
jects, and the duty to refrain from those measures whose affects
will extend long into the state of peace. One may say that the use
of nuclear weapons is a challenge to the very basis of most interna-
tional law ....
If one wishes, one may cite in addition to the above-mentioned
provisions of the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions
of 1949, several other treaty provisions which cannot be executed
once nuclear warfare has begun. Among others, all those provi-
sions on the treatment of the sick and wounded and war prisoners
and civilian population would become impossible to carry out. The
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, which was
drafted at The Hague in 1954, could also be put into the wastebas-
ket. All that would be left would be complete terror and chaos,
and it is not difficult to imagine what the world would be like after
a nuclear war. . . . In this connection many scholars and even
military experts refer to the fact that nuclear weapons are inhuman
- the word torture has been mentioned in this connection - and
therefore their use is also against the so-called Martens clause in
the preamble to the Fourth Hague Convention . . . . Nor have
those who condemn nuclear weapons forgotten certain other parts
in the . . . preamble to the St. Petersburg Declaraton .... 259
The above analysis suggests that the use of either tactical or stra-
tegic weapons would be illegal under international law. 26°
258. Singh, supra note 237, at 106.
259. Castren, supra note 243, at 96-97. The use of nuclear weapons also may violate
United States constitutional law. See Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law, 7
NOVA L. J. 21 (1982); Miller, The Constitutional Challenge of Nuclear Weapons: A Note on the
Obligation to Ward Off Extinction, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 317 (1983); Stone, Presidential
First Use Is Unlawful, 56 FOREIGN POL'Y 94 (1984).
260. See McDougal and Schlei, supra note 196, at 648, 689-90. McDougal and Schlei
explain:
It would appear the most rational course is to withhold blanket judgement and to
appraise each specific use of nuclear weapons, as most other weapons and destructive
practices are appraised, in the total context of such specific use.
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C. Nuclear Targeting Strategies
A countervalue 261 deployment of nuclear weapons in response to
a conventional attack against American or allied troops arguably
would constitute a legally disproportionate and unnecessary response.
Nuclear weapons designed for countervalue or city-busting targeting
generally possess 1,500 times the explosive power of the bombs
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These "dirty bombs" produce
severe nuclear fallout and have a "circular error probable" (CEP) of
between 0.3-and-2.5 kilometers (300-to-2500 meters) - "which is to
say that they lack pinpoint ccuracy. ' 262 Thus, "in addition to violat-
ing the Rule. . .against chemical, biological, and 'analogous' means
of warfare, their capacity for violating all the other prohibitory rules
noted, and on a truly awesome scale, seems self-evident. ' 263 Professor
Weston asks,
[w]here is the military necessity in incinerating entire urban popu-
lations, defiling the territory of neighboring and distant neutral
countries, and ravaging the natural environment. . . for the pur-
pose of containing or repelling a conventional attack? Surely a fail-
ure to provide for an adequate conventional defense or to develop
alternative energy sources does not excuse these probable results.
If so, then we are witness to the demise of Nuremberg, the triumph
of Kriegsraison, the virtual repudiation of the humanitarian rules of
armed conflict in at least large-scale warfare. The very meaning of
"proportionality" becomes lost, and we come dangerously close to
condoning the crime of genocide, that is, a military campaign di-
rected more towards the extinction of the enemy than towards the
winning of a battle or conflict.
264
A counterforce nuclear strike in response to a conventional at-
tack also would violate the "proportionality" principle. The deploy-
ment of nuclear weapons with inherently low levels of accuracy
inevitably would injure or kill civilians. A 1979 United States con-
gressional study suggests that "between two million and twenty mil-
lion Americans would be killed within thirty days after a counter-silo
attack on United States ICBM sites, due mainly to early radiation
fallout from likely surface bursts. The test of proportionality is thus
261. Countervalue targeting refers to a nuclear attack directed against an adversary's cities
and industries. Counterforce targeting refers to a nuclear attack directed against an adversary's
armed forces.
262. Weston, supra note 3, at 6.
263. Id.
264. Weston, supra note 215, at 578.
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greatly strained once again. ' 265 The counterforce attack will proba-
bly fail to knock out the other side's nuclear arsenal and will lead to a
retaliatory nuclear strike and to a cycle of nuclear escalation.
In fact, both countervalue and counterforce targeting strategies
likely will lead to similar results. Professor Falk notes that:
Because of the magnitude and properties of current nuclear weap-
ons . . . , and because of their contemplated use in and around
cities (there are, for instance, sixty-two military objectives targeted
within the city limits of Moscow!), the cumulative blast and fallout
effects from multiple nuclear explosions, the number of targets re-
garded as "military", and the clustering of military targets near
population centers, even an official policy that limits the use of nu-
clear weapons by reference to the military character of the target is
not different in effect from an overtly indiscriminate targeting pol-
icy. Furthermore, the World War II experience with the un-
restricted bombardment of cities and with unrestricted submarine
warfare suggests that a self-limiting framework of policies and tac-
tics confining deliberate destruction to the enemy's military targets
gives way in war-time to considerations of battlefield effectiveness,
understood to include strikes against cities to weaken the resolve of
the enemy society.266
A country deploying nuclear weapons in response to a threatened
nuclear attack also would have the burden of demonstrating that its
anticipatory nuclear strike was proportional to the damage likely to
result from the unexecuted threat. Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter admonishes states to undertake minimally coercive and non-
violent modes of conflict resolution and vests primary responsibility
for conflict resolution in the United Nations Security Council. 2 6 7 Pro-
fessor Weston concludes that "it is difficult to conceive of any nuclear
threat that could not be met by some lesser preemptive mode - ex-
265. CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE
EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR 84 (1979) cited in Weston, supra note 215, at 587.
266. Falk, Toward a Legal Regime for Nuclear Weapons, 28 MCGILL L.J. 519, 528 (1983).
267. Charter Of The United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans
1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 10, 43, art. 51.
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain inter-
national peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
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cept, of course, in the case of foreign policies lacking in creative imag-
ination and insensitive to the magnitude of the human values at
stake. 2
68
A country employing a retaliatory nuclear strike also would have
to demonstrate that its retaliatory attack was proportional to the ini-
tial enemy attack. A countervalue retaliatory nuclear strike would
violate Article 51(6) of the 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Conventions
which provides that "attacks against the civilian population of civil-
ians by way of reprisals are prohibited. ' 269 Such an attack would ap-
pear to serve a retributive rather than a defensive purpose and may
lead to an escalating cycle of nuclear retaliation.
A retaliatory counterforce attack against the attacking country's
nuclear arsenals would appear to be a proportionate, defensive mea-
sure. However, as pointed out earlier, nuclear weapons are inaccurate
and it is doubtful whether the damage resulting from a retaliatory
nuclear attack could be limited to military targets. "Additionally,
there is the customary injunction that reprisals be taken only as meas-
ures of last resort. In the context of nuclear war, this injunction is all
the more imperative.
'270
What of the legality of a limited, tactical nuclear strike against a
designated target? It appears that it is legal to deploy a low-yield,
relatively "clean" and accurate nuclear weapon as a defensive mea-
sure against enemy troops or missile installations.27' However, "no
such option is available among existing intermediate-range theater
weapons. ' 272 "[A] fission weapon must be regarded as 'dirty'....
its explosion in the air and, of course, at ground-level still would re-
sult in some radioactive contamination, albeit not as extensive as
when nuclear technology as less 'tailored' than it is today. '273 Sixty
percent of the "theater" or "battlefield" weapons employed by NATO
and Warsaw Pact countries are above the thirteen-to-twenty-two-kilo-
ton range of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs274 and the deploy-
ment of these weapons inevitably would cause collateral damage
beyond their designated target.
The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons also may lead to a
268. Weston, supra note 215, at 579.
269. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 203, at Article 51(6).
270. Weston, supra note 215, at 586.
271. Id. at 583.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 582.
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series of nuclear exchanges culminating in the deployment of strategic
nuclear weapons. The inaccurate and destructive character of tactical
nuclear weapons, when combined with the likelihood that the use of
such weapons will escalate into a strategic nuclear exchange, leads
Professor Weston to conclude that the deployment of tactical nuclear
weapons violates the proportionality principal.
275
[T]actical nuclear warfare, at least at theater level, would result in
hundreds and thousands of nuclear explosions and, consequently,
untold immediate and long-range, long-term collateral harms. In
addition, once unleashed, the probability that tactical nuclear war-
fare could be kept at theater or battlefield level would be small. A
crisis escalating to the first use of even relatively small nuclear
weapons would bring us dangerously close to the ultimate state, a
"strategic exchange", particularly if one of the two sides saw itself
at a disadvantage in a drawn out "tactical exchange". In sum,
once out of the bottle, likely as not even the tactical nuclear genie
would quite literally cause "all hell to break loose". This fact...
would seem by any rational analysis to run hard up against the
principle of proportionality upon which the doctrine of military
necessity is premised. 27
6
Analysts should be wary of conceding that nuclear weapons may
be legally deployed under any circumstances (e.g. a retaliatory strike)
since such exceptions may be subject to abuse. As Professor Falk
observes:
[P]olitically congenial uses of force are routinely characterized as
"defensive", whereas politicically hostile uses of force are con-
demned as "aggressive". To some extent, this incoherence flows
from polemical uses of the law to serve the interests of state power,
but to some extent, it also genuinely reflects a "misperception" that
follows from the diversity of perspectives of different states, with
different accesses to information, and different ideologies, cultures
and worldviews.277
VI. CONCLUSION: A DECLARATION ON THE PREVENTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF NUCLEAR HUMANCIDE
It has been argued that there is doctrinal support for the proposi-
tion that the use of nuclear weapons is prohibited under international
law. Any scheme of legal regulation of nuclear weapons is likely to
275. Id. at 583-84.
276. Id.
277. Falk, supra note 266, at 534.
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fail since "international law cannot hope to regulate the pursuit of
decisive military state interests, and nuclear weapons are manifestly
weapons of military decisiveness. ' 278 As Professor Bilder has argued,
"the first step is to go back to the idea, proposed at the beginning of
the atomic age, that the use of such weapons be expressly outlawed, or
at least, that any first use of such weapons be renounced and
banned."
279
A Declaration on the Prevention and Punishment of Nuclear
Humancide, at a minimum, should define as international crimes, the
production, testing,280 possession, use and threat or advocacy of the
use of nuclear weapons. 28' Particularly severe sanctions should be ap-
plied to individuals who deploy nuclear weapons against civilians or
against targets where civilians are likely to be injured. 2 2 Individuals
and political officials should be liable for violations of the declaration
even if they have been authorized by the state to act.
28 3
The drafting of a Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Nuclear Humancide would likely be opposed by the
superpowers and their allies. It therefore appears to be a utopian pro-
posal. However, such a Convention arguably would reflect the collec-
tive consciousness, morality and aspirations of the peoples of the
world; its drafting and ratification should not be frustrated by nation-
state self-interest. Professor Martin Feinrider argues that:
Despite the elitist assumptions normally associated with govern-
ance and the present nation-state system, consensus and law -
even on the international level - can be built from the bottom up.
In fact, given the failure of the world's leaders to respond effec-
tively to the challenge of nuclear weapons, we may have no choice
but to rely on the efforts and consciousness of the people of the
United States, the Soviet Union and all other nations. 28
4
The translation of popular aspirations into an international legal
instrument prohibiting and preventing nuclear humancide can serve
278. Id. at 531.
279. Bilder, supra note 256, at 959.
280. See, Disormament for a Just World: Declaration of Principles, Proposals for a Treaty,
and Call for Action (issued on the occassion of the International Workshop on Disarmament,
27-31 March 1978, New Delhi, India) reprinted in TOWARD A JUST WORLD ORDER 284 (R.
Falk, S. Kim, and S. Medlovitz eds. 1982).
281. Falk, supra note 266, at 537-38.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Feinrider, International Law as Law of the Land: Another Constitutional Constraint
on Use of Nuclear Weapons, 7 NOVA L.J. 103, 112 (1982).
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as an effective mechanism for curbing the nuclear arms race and for
limiting the use of nuclear weapons.
[International law] can help limit or even prevent future use of nu-
clear weapons by defining considerations of policy-makers, sway-
ing public dialogue, providing ammunition for anti-nuclear
populist movements, and demonstrating to all willing to listen the
complete incompatabilty of nuclear weaponry with virtually the
entire thrust of the post-World War II effort to create structures
and norms supportive of international peace and security. Should
these ends be accomplished, they could well become means to the
creation of law, and no small feat will have been done.
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